Substance dualism is compatible not only with Cartesian dualism but also with a number of nonCartesian alternatives, including several varieties of Thomistic dualism, William Hasker's emergent subject dualism, and the holistic anthropology of E. J. Lowe. Due to recent developments within the philosophy of mind, a renewed interest in historical and contemporary theories of the soul, and a more careful evaluation of what does and does not follow from neuroscience, substance dualism is back on the table for a serious critical (...) reevaluation. This chapter reviews the developments in the philosophy of mind and in scholarship on the soul. It shows that substance dualists and their many critics have been brought together by a shared focus on the nature of mental subjects. The chapter also presents an overview of the key concepts discussed in the subsequent chapters of this book. (shrink)

A biblical approach to reconciling God’s sovereignty with creaturely responsibility should avoid the extremes of global occasionalism and completely autonomous creatures. This paper evaluates the standard intermediary solutions offered by conservationists and concurrentists. It argues that while each contributes insights which a satisfactory account should retain, none is fully adequate. Even Leibniz’s sophisticated response, which accounts for providence, miracles, and moral responsibility, unacceptably abridges creaturely power to implement decisions. My alternative proposal seeks to explain how creatures can retain full responsibility (...) for their actions even though God reserves the right to override creaturely power with His greater power. (shrink)

According to Christian physicalism (CP), a human person does not have an immaterial soul, but is identical to or constituted by a physical object. This chapter focuses on several reasons to think CP does not adequately account for the stewardship obligations. If CP is properly confined to the resources actually available to a physicalist anthropology it seems unable to account for the capacities of stewards, including a first‐person perspective, knowledge of the natural world, reasoning, and the ability to act. To (...) the extent that CP does seem able to account for these capacities, it relies heavily on a nonexplanatory notion of emergence and apparently nonphysical notions of teleology and life. But on physicalism, concepts emerge as the result of causal interactions with the brain, and this means that those concepts are limited to what can be explained by the individual learning history of a human organism or natural selection operating on the human species. (shrink)

John Searle claims that reasoning requires libertarian free will. He hopes this can be reconciled with a naturalistic neuroscience through a sophisticated theory of emergence, which includes indeterminism, and topdown causation. This is allegedly naturalistic because each mental state is causally reducible to a realizing neuronal state. I argue that Searle’s theory fails to overcome four main problems and cannot account for reasoning without implicit appeal to nonnaturalistic entities.

Christian philosophers have engaged naturalism in three main ways: direct refutation; systematic comparison; and sustained development of compelling alternative accounts. While all of these options have value, I argue that it is, and especially, that are most likely to win converts, and that we are witnessing an encouraging strategic shift in that direction. Options and bring Christian philosophers into closer dialogue with their naturalistic counterparts, building mutual respect and a greater opportunity for Christian philosophers to gain a full and fair (...) hearing. This points to a bright future for Christian philosophy. (shrink)

Questions of religious liberty have become flashpoints of controversy in virtually every area of life around the world. Despite protection of religious liberty at both supranational and individual state levels, there is an increasing number of conflicts concerning the proper way to recognize it, both in modern secular states, and in countries with an established religion or theocratic mode of government. This book provides an analysis of the general concept of religious liberty with a close study of important cases that (...) serve as a test bed for proposals. It combines the insights of both pure academics and experienced practitioners in law to take a fresh look at the nature, scope and limits of religious liberty. Divided into two parts, the collection presents a blend of legal and philosophical approaches, and draws on cases from a wide range of jurisdictions, including Brazil, India, Australia, USA, Netherlands, and Canada. Presenting a broad range of views, this often provocative volume makes fascinating reading for academics and researchers working in the areas of law and religion, legal philosophy and human rights. (shrink)